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ARGUMENT
~

Mrs. Prounis is arguing in this appeal, as is admitted by Mark Koller ("Mark") in
Appellee' s Brief, "that there was not enough evidence for the district court to find that
VJlb

[Mrs.] Prounis was equitably estopped" from seeking compensation for her
approximately seven years of service to her father as his Guardian and Co-Conservator.
(Appellee Br. 28.) Make no mistake, through this appeal Mrs. Prounis has challenged all
aspects of the District Court's conclusion that Mrs. Prounis was equitably estopped. The
scarce evidence provid~d by Mark did not support the District Court's conclusion that
Mrs. Prounis was equitably estopped from seeking compensation. Indeed, the very
limited evidence available to the District Court demonstrates just the opposite.
Specifically, Mrs. Prounis's current claim is not inconsistent with her prior statements;
Mark and his siblings did not take reasonable action on the basis of Mrs. Prounis's
statements; and, there will be no injury were Mrs. Prounis to be reimbursed/compensated
for her many years of service to her father. In any event, there was a dearth of evidence
on this issue as the equitable estoppel defense was only first raised in opposition to Mrs.

~

Prounis's motion for compensation (where Mark devoted only two pages of argument to
the defense), and the District Court wrongfully failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing
on the matter. Furthermore, the District Court erred in treating Mrs. Prounis and Dan
differently.
In Appellee's Brief, Mark makes inconsistent, self-serving, factually inaccurate,

'.!jj

and otherwise unpersuasive arguments as to why Mrs. Prounis' s arguments fail. On the

1
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one hand, Mark points to the thin record addressing equitable estoppel to argue that Mrs.
Prounis failed to raise and preserve her arguments for appeal. Yet, despite this thin record
and the fact that the issue of estoppel was only first raised in Mark's opposition, Mark
simultaneously argues that this Court should afford great deference to the District Court
and determine that the District Court did not err in weighing the evidence, making
numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law, and failing to hold an evidentiary
hearing on the matter. Mark cannot have his cake and eat it too. An appellate court's
deference to a trial court's findings of fact is based on the concept that the trial judge has
observed the witness's appearance and demeanor-something that was not done with
respect to this motion and issue. Here, there was no trial, there was no evidentiary
hearing, and there was minimal briefing on this issue that would justify this Court
deferring to the trial court's findings and conclusions. The record before this Court is the
same as the record before the District Court. An analysis of that record demonstrates the
trial court lacked the evidence necessary to make its findings and conclusions, improperly
failed to hold an evidentiary hearing, and improperly weighed the evidence in
discriminating against Mrs. Prounis and contrary to public policy considerations.
Accordingly, the District Court's decision should be overturned and the case remanded
for further proceedings.
THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The parties do not dispute that this Court should review the trial court's legal
conclusions for correctness. However, the parties do dispute the appropriate standard

2
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with respect to the trial court's factual findings. As is recognized by Appellee,
(,;JO

"[d]ifferent degrees of deference apply to mixed questions oflaw and fact." (Appellee Br.
1.) Appellee, however, argues that the Court should review the District Court findings for
clear error and that the District Court should be "given a great degree of deference."
(Appellee Br. 1.) This is not the appropriate standard. The situation where an appellate
court will give a trial court great deference is where the trial court relies on such things as
~

the witness's appearance and demeanor. See In re Adoption ofBaby B., 2012 UT 35, 11
42, 47, 308 P.3d 382 (recognizing that courts may review mixed determinations de novo
under certain circumstances, such as where the facts are reflected in the record and where
the trial court did not rely on witness's appearance and demeanor); see also State Dept. of

Human Servs. Ex rel. Parker v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 681-82 (Utah 1997) ("A situation
such as this, which presents this court with a close question of the facts, illustrates the
wisdom of our 'fair degree of deference' to the trial court. While the evidence before the
trial court was somewhat ambiguous, 'the trial judge has observed 'facts' such as the

witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot
~

be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts."') (quoting Jouflas v.

Fox Television Stations, Inc., 927 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added). Such is not the case here. Indeed, the limited facts on which the trial
court relied in denying Mrs. Prounis' request for compensation are reflected in the record.

(See generally Order, R. 6098-6103.) Accordingly, the Court should employ a de novo
1,/j)

vii)

review, with little to no deference to the trial court. See Baby B.

3

1142, 47.
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I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING AS A MATTER OF
LAW THAT MRS. PROUNIS IS ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING ANY
COMPENSATION FOR HER YEARS OF SERVICE TO HER FATHER.

As the party asserting the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel, Mark carried
the burden of demonstrating each of the elements for the defense. See, e.g., Masters v.
Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). These elements are "(i) a statement by
a party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action taken on the basis of
the first statement; and (iii) injury that would result from allowing the party to contradict
or repudiate such statement." (Add. 7 (citing Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999
UT 100, 134, 989 P.2d 1077).) The District Court erred in determining that Mark met his
burden. 1
A.

The Court Erred in Concluding that Mrs. Prounis's Prior Statements
Were Inconsistent with Her Later Claim for Compensation.

Cw

At no point did Mrs. Prounis state that she would not seek compensation for her
services after her father's passing. Instead, Mrs. Prounis wanted to ensure that her father
had sufficient funds for his care during his lifetime. (R. 5263-68, 5537-40.) And by
agreeing not to be paid during her father's lifetime, Mrs. Prounis enabled her father to
have the resources he needed for his care for close to seven years and she averted what
would have been a tragic outcome for her father had she not stepped in to the roles as

1

Mark's contention that Mrs. Prounis somehow failed to preserve the argument or argue
on appeal that the evidence did not support the District Court's legal conclusions is
belied by the record and briefing in this case. Indeed, the majority of Mrs. Prounis' s
motion to reconsider/motion to make further findings focuses on the fact that the
evidence in this case demonstrates that Mrs. Prounis was not equitably estopped from
seeking compensation. (See, e.g., R. 5972-78.)

4
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4iL.

Guardian and Co-Conservator. (R. 5264-69.) Consistent with Mrs. Prounis's intent to
seek compensation after her father's passing, Mrs. Prounis established a record of her
hours spent for purposes of supporting post-death compensation. (R. 5540.)
Despite this intent and these actions by Mrs. Prounis, the District Court concluded
that Mrs. Prounis' s claim for compensation was inconsistent with prior statements
concerning the performance of her duties as Guardian and Co-Conservator. (Add. 2-3
("Prounis' attorney argued that Prounis should be appointed as permanent guardian and
conservator because Evan Koller' s estate could not afford to pay a third-party guardian
and Prounis 'ha[d] been doing the guardianship voluntarily and ha[d] been saving Mr.
Koller a substantial amount of money' and therefore the Court should maintain the status
quo implying that Prounis would continue to serve without compensation."). The
statements relied on by the District Court are not inconsistent with Mrs. Prounis' claim
for compensation after her father's death, especially when viewed together with the
surrounding evidence (such as itemization of hours worked) and her intent to conserve
assets for her father's care during his lifetime. (R. 5263-68, 5537-40.) Moreover, the
~

District Court failed to consider that the reasons to "maintain the stauts quo" (conserving
funds to care for the Ward) were only valid while the Ward was alive.
Appellee argues that Mrs. Prounis' s statements about acting "pro bono" are
somehow dispositive of the issue. (Appellee Br. at 34.) Appellee contends that the "plain
meaning of 'pro bono' is simply 'uncompensated."' (Id.) This argument is unpersuasive,
and Appellee's reliance on Black's Law Dictionary demonstrates this point. The literal

5
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meaning of "Pro bono" is "for the public good," and the Black's Law Dictionary
definition for "pro bono" is "[ o]for relating to uncompensated legal services performed
esp. for the public good." Mrs. Prounis did not, and legally and ethically could not,
perform legal services in her capacity as Guardian and Co-Conservator as she is not an

~

attorney. Her service was for the "public good" as she tirelessly served her father and
ensured that he had sufficient funds to live out the remaining years in relative comfortsomething that would not have happened had she not stepped in to those dual roles as the
estate would have been entirely drained before her father's passing. Looking at all of the
evidence on the matter, Mrs. Prounis's use of the phrases "pro bono" and "without
compensation" is not inconsistent with her claim for compensation once her father
passed away.

B.

The Court Erred In Concluding that Reasonable Action Was Taken By
Mark and His Siblings In Reliance of Mrs. Prounis's Statements.

Even if Mrs. Prounis' motion for compensation was inconsistent with her prior
statements, which they are not, a legal conclusion of estoppel was still improper because
the record evidence did not support the trial court's conclusion that reasonable action was
taken in reliance of Mrs. Prounis' s statements.
There was simply insufficient evidence demonstrating that Mark ( or the other
siblings) reasonably relied on the statements and changed their positions as required for
equitable estoppel to apply. See, e.g., Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co.,
2011 UT 33

,r 42, 258 P.3d 539 (recognizing that for equitable estoppel to apply, the

statement must induce the "other party to change its position by relying on the

6
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(jJ

vi

inconsistent act"). The trial court's sole finding of fact allegedly supporting the reliance
VP

element of estoppel was that "[t]he record establishes the other beneficiaries of the Estate
initially objected to Ms. Prounis' appointment as guardian and co-conservator. However,
~

the beneficiaries subsequently supported her appointment based on her representation that
she would act in these capacities 'without compensation' and 'pro bono. "' (Add. 3-4,
Finding of Fact 11.) The evidence does not support this conclusion at all. Instead, the
record demonstrates that: ( 1) Mark, Mrs. My lander and Mrs. Sabour never took action
supporting the appointment of Mrs. Prounis as Guardian or Co-Conservator; (2) Mark,
Mrs. Mylander and Mrs. Sabour consistently opposed Mrs. Prounis for approximately
seven years through numerous objections; and, (3) Mark, Mrs. Mylander and Mrs. Sabour
sought to remove Mrs. Prounis as Guardian in 2011. (R. 1457-62, 1545-79, 1584-1662,
1989-96, 2067-75, 3860-77, 4063-71; see also Add. 17-38.) Mrs. Prounis's siblings
consistently opposed her and challenged her every step of the way despite the fact that
she was not seeking compensation from her father for her services during the lifetime of
her father.
Furthermore, not only did Mark and his siblings fail to "change" positions, but
they were never in a position to rely on the statements to begin with. Only the Ward
could reasonably rely on Mrs. Prounis's statements due to the special fiduciary
relationship between Mrs. Prounis and her Ward. As a court-appointed Guardian and CoConservator of her father, Mrs. Prounis's statements about not seeking compensation

!,,JI

vJ

during his lifetime were in satisfaction of her fiduciary duties to act only in her father's

7
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best interests and, therefore, her statements were intended only for the benefit of her
father during his lifetime, and no other person. The other children of Evan 0. Koller had
no special legal relationship (fiduciary or contractual) with Mrs. Prounis. They had no
reasonable basis to assume that Mrs. Prounis' s statements were ever made for their
personal financial benefit after their father's death so they could prevail on an estoppel
claim to deny Mrs. Prounis just compensation because paying her would adversely effect
~

their selfish interests of maximizing their potential inheritance. The trial court erred in
finding that such persons ever had a basis for relying on the statements of Mrs. Prounis
outside the context of what was in the best interests of Evan Koller during his lifetime.
Mrs. Prounis' s statements and conduct were clearly not intended to induce reliance by her
siblings whose personal economic stakes after her father's death was not within the scope
of her fiduciary duties. Appellee's arguments concerning an interested party's "standing"
to object to certain actions of a custodian or guardian for the benefit of the Ward during
~

his lifetime is different than being in the position to reasonably rely on alleged statements
to invoke the disfavored doctrine of equitable estoppel for solely personal motivations.
Appellee's statutory references are misplaced because although interested family
members have the right to object to guardians/conservators reports, they do not have the
standing to object to compensation requests. Furthermore, such objections can only be
asserted to protect the interests of the Ward, not their contingent inheritance rights. Mark,
Mrs. Mylander, and Mrs. Sabour lacked the standing to even object to the request.
Indeed, in Appellee's Brief, Mark argues that it was "undisputed that the district court

8
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appointed Prounis on the basis that she was acting without compensation." (Appellee Br.
36.) Even if that were the case, the trial court's reliance cannot support equitable
estoppel as a matter of law. 2
Finally, at an absolute minimum, Mark and his siblings could not have reasonably
relied or otherwise changed their positions based on the alleged representations from
Mrs. Prounis that occurred during or after the various and repeated motions to remove
Mrs. Prounis from her position. (See Appellee's Br. at 29 (citing six alleged
representations from Mrs. Prounis regarding compensation, only one of which was in
2009, with the other five being in 2011 or later).) In other words, any initial reliance on
Mrs. Prounis' s statements clearly ceased in 2011 when the siblings filed numerous
v,

motions to remove Mrs. Prounis from her role as Guardian and Co-Conservator. (R.
1457-62, 1545-79, 1584-1662, 1989-96, 2067-75, 3860-77, 4063-71; see also Add. 1738.) Accordingly, at an absolute minimum, Mrs. Prounis would not be estopped from

vi)

receiving compensation from 2011 forward.

C.

The Court Erred in Concluding There was Injury.

The record evidence does not support the District Court's legal conclusion of

(,tjj

injury. First, the assets of the Estate belonged to Evan Koller during his lifetime, and such
assets did not belong to the siblings at the time of Mrs. Prounis' s statements, nor at any
time thereafter. Accordingly, any potential "injury" could only be suffered by Evan
Koller. Second, even if compensating Mrs. Prounis could be construed as somehow
2

vP

The trial court did not rule on judicial estoppel and judicial estoppel is not at issue in
this appeal.

9
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limiting the eventual distribution to Mark and the other siblings, such compensation
would not injure Mark and the siblings because the other alternative vigorously argued
for by the siblings was the continued use of a professional guardian and conservator who
charged approximately twice as much as Mrs. Prounis. (R. 1086-1111, 5264-68, 554045.) Accordingly, even if she were to be compensated for everything she has requested
(as she should), Mrs. Prounis' s actions still had the effect of saving the Estate significant
~

funds. There would have been significantly less assets available to the siblings after their
father's death had Mrs. Prounis not stepped up in taking on the role as Guardian and CoConservator in place of the professional guardians and conservators. (R. 1086-1111,

~

5540-45.)
D.

Public Policy Supports Compensation for Mrs. Prounis.

Equitable estoppel is a disfavored remedy under Utah law. See, e.g., Salt Lake City
Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co., 2011 UT 33140, 258 P.3d 539. "It should be applied

rarely ... and only when necessary to avoid injustice." Id. (citations omitted). As
outlined throughout this briefing, the evidence in this case did not support the District
Court's application of equitable estoppel to deny Mrs. Prounis compensation. This error
is made even clearer when considering the public policy issues at play in this matter.
Utah law and public policy favors fairly compensating family caregivers of incapacitated
adults who must make many personal and financial sacrifices for the care of their wards.
Equity demands a very high bar to deny compensation to someone such as Mrs. Prounis,
who fairly deserves to be compensated, when the outcome is simply unjust enrichment to
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~

the other siblings who do not deserve to benefit from words and conduct clearly intended
to benefit a protected person. Appellee has little to no response on the public policy
arguments and issues raised by Mrs. Prounis, and his silence is understandable because
vriJ

the public policy considerations weigh heavily in favor of compensating Mrs. Prounis in
this action.
II.

THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT ESTOPPEL IN LIGHT OF DAN'S
POSITION AND STATEMENTS CONCERNING COMPENSATION, NOR
WAS IT EQUITABLE TO TREAT DAN AND MRS. PROUNIS
DIFFERENTLY.

A.

Mrs. Prounis Clearly Preserved These Issues in Her Motion for
Reconsideration.

As an initial matter, there can be no question that Mrs. Prounis raised and argued
~

before the trial court the inequitable, unfair, and improper decision of the trial court to
award Dan compensation while denying compensation to Mrs. Prounis, who not only did
substantially more work than Dan as a Co-Conservator but also wore two hats and
simultaneously performed the difficult job of being her father's Guardian as well. This
issue was a very large aspect of Mrs. Prounis' objection to the draft order-so much so
that the the District Court expressly addressed the issue in its order. Although unclear, it
appears that Appellee is arguing that although Mrs. Prounis addressed this issue below,
and has certainly argued the issue on appeal, the issue was not properly preserved
because Mrs. Prounis allegedly failed to argue or suggest that the disparate treatment was
improper. There is no merit to that argument and Mrs. Prounis's argument before the trial

Vii
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court and before this Court demonstrates that fact, in addition to the fact that disparate
treatment of Dan and Mrs. Prounis is inequitable, unfair and improper on its face. 3

B.

The District Court Erred by Refusing to Defer to Dan's Position that
Mrs. Prounis was Entitled to Some Compensation.

Dan did not oppose the Motion for Reconsideration concerning Mrs. Prounis' s
request for compensation. (Add. 36-38.) Furthermore, at the hearing on June 4, 2015,
Dan, while objecting to the amount of compensation, did not object to Mrs. Prounis
receiving some compensation. In fact, counsel for Dan agreed that Mrs. Prounis should be
compensated in some way. (R. 4320-22, 5540-41.) In light of these realities, Appellee

attempts to minimize the impact of these facts by arguing that Dan's position was
essentially irrelevant. (Appellee Br. at 39-41.) This is not the case. As co-conservator,
Dan, indeed, had the statutory authority to award compensation to Mrs. Prounis during
the time that he served in that capacity. Because he would not be awarding compensation
to himself, the transaction would not create a conflict of interest that would require the
matter to be brought to the trial court. See Utah Code Ann.§ 75-5-422. And although
Dan was no longer serving in that capacity at the time the motion was filed, his position
on this issue weighs heavily in favor of awarding compensation to Mrs. Prounis. The
District Court erred in not properly accounting for this evidence.

3

Indeed, the opening line of Mrs. Prounis' s Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Reconsider or in the Alternative Rule 52 Motion to Make Further Findings and to Alter
the Order and Judgment provides: "Manifest injustice would occur if the Court treated
Mrs. Prounis differently than her brother [Dan]." (R. 5972.)

12
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~

C.

The District Court Improperly Discriminated Against Mrs. Prounis.

l,[,,p

The District Court improperly discriminated against Mrs. Prounis by denying her
compensation while granting compensation to her brother who did substantially less work
vJ

for the Ward (as a Co-Conservator in addition to not serving as a Guardian) and whose
conduct and representations were consistent with Mrs. Prounis in not seeking
compensation before the death of the Ward. The District Court appears to have justified
its decision to treat these two differently based on the incorrect premise that Mrs. Prounis
made representations to the District Court during Evan Koller' s life about not seeking
compensation while her sibling, Dan did not. (Add. 2-4.) As was explained in Mrs.
Prounis's opening brief, the representations made by Mrs. Prounis in pleadings about not
seeking compensation during Evan Koller's life were made jointly by Dan. There is no
equitable or legal reason for the District Court to have denied Mrs. Prounis
compensation, while granting Dan Koller compensation. Mrs. Prounis appears to have
been singled out for different treatment.

III.
VJD

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO CREATE A FULL AND FAIR RECORD
AND TO ADDRESS THE DISPUTED FACTS.
A.

The Issue of An Evidentiary Hearing Was Clearly Raised Below and Is
Properly Before the Court.

Once again, Appellee attempts to argue that Mrs. Prounis somehow failed to argue
or otherwise preserve an issue before the trial court despite the fact that the Motion to
Reconsider expressly addresses this issue and explains in detail why the court had erred
with respect to the proposed order. Indeed, Appellee's argument concerning an
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evidentiary hearing is belied by the very title of Mrs. Prounis' s motion to reconsider:
Motion to Reconsider or in the Alternative Rule 52 Motion to Make Further Findings and
to Alter or Amend the Order and Judgment. (R. 5533, 5537, 5972) (emphasis added.)
Mrs. Prounis argued the need for further findings and expressly argued that the District
Court had not yet held a trial or evidentiary hearing on the issue. (R. 5981.) And contrary
to Appellee's argument, the trial court did not fix the problems associated with its failure
to hold an evidentiary hearing and the issue is squarely before this Court.
B.

The District Court Erred in Failing to Hold an Evidentiary Hearing.

In this case, the District Court erred by failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to
not only address the numerous disputed facts concerning Mrs. Prounis' s statements, the
alleged actions of her siblings as a result of those statements, the injury that will
supposedly result from allowing compensation to Mrs. Prounis, and Dan's statements and
position concerning compensation, but to even create a sufficient record that could justify
the legal conclusions wrongfully and prematurely entered by the Court. As has been
explained throughout this brief and in Mrs. Prounis' s opening brief, the trial court lacked
sufficient facts to make the legal conclusions concerning equitable estoppel. Indeed, the
evidence simply does not support the conclusions. The district court could have (and
should have) avoided this problem by holding an evidentiary hearing to create a sufficient
record to address this defense-a defense that was raised in two pages of argument in
opposition to the motion for compensation. This was clear error by the trial court and the
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case should be remanded to allow the trial court to obtain and then properly weigh the
facts necessary to support a conclusion concerning equitable estoppel.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the District Court's Orders
and remand the case for further proceedings. Oral argument is respectfully requested in
this case.
DATED this 3rd day of October 2016.
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

Matthew N. Evans
Matthew M. Cannon
Attorneys for Appellant Kathryn Prounis
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